Nothing is the short answer.
Below are extracts from The House of Commons Select Committee Report of March 2005 on the The Influence of the Pharmaceutical Industry… March 2005 – that’s a long time ago and the UK drugs regulator, the MHRA, has still made none of the changes recommended.
The Select Committee summed up:
“The MHRA, like many regulatory organisations, is entirely funded by fees from those it regulates. However, unlike many regulators, it competes with other European agencies for fee income… dangers of the present arrangements…. During this long inquiry we became aware of serious weaknesses in the MHRA. Worryingly, in both its written and oral evidence the Agency seemed oblivious to the critical views of outsiders and unable to accept that it had any obvious shortcomings, except those that could be remedied by more transparency. The Agency’s attitude to its public health responsibilities suggested some complacency and a lack of requisite competency, reducing our confidence in its ability to undertake the reforms needed to earn and deserve public trust.
The consequences of lax oversight is that the industry’s influence has expanded and a number of practices have developed which act against the public interest.”
Download the full report here, in the meantime here are a few choice extracts:
Page 4: The industry is by no means solely to blame for the difficulties we describe. The regulators and prescribers are also open to criticism.
Page 8: The industry is hugely influential ….Its influence in Parliament is extensive. The Annex lists the All-Party Groups the pharmaceutical industry supports.
Page 4: The regulator, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), has failed to adequately scrutinise licensing data and its post-marketing surveillance is inadequate. The organisation has been too close to the industry, a closeness underpinned by common policy objectives, agreed processes, frequent contact, consultation and interchange of staff. We are concerned that a rather lax regime is exacerbated by the MHRA’s need to compete with other European regulators for licence application business.
Page 5: The Government, like the MHRA, has tended to assume that all is for the best… In view of the failings of the MHRA, we recommend a fundamental review of the organisation
Page 30: The MHRA is unusual in being one of few European agencies where the operation of the medicines regulatory system is funded entirely by fees derived from services to industry
Page 31: The MHRA relies on company data, presented as a series of detailed assessment reports, in its decision whether or not to licence a drug. Raw data is very rarely analysed.
Page 49: The consent forms do not inform patients that the raw data may be maintained by the industry, not made available to the general public or even reviewed by the regulatory authorities.Much of the criticism was essentially of the lack of transparency and the difficulties for doctors and others in assessing the research which is undertaken.
Page 52: The major impetus for greater transparency with medicines came from a lawsuit brought in August 2004 by the New York State Attorney General against GSK, alleging the company had concealed negative clinical trial results. As part of the settlement, GSK agreed to set up a public register of all clinical trials on all of its drugs.This breached a longstanding
convention, vigorously upheld by the regulators, whereby clinical trial results
were regarded as company property and commercially confidential.
Page 52: Too many problems appear to persist unnoticed or unacknowledged by the organisations that are central to the co-ordination, conduct and review of the clinical trials.
Page 78: The relationship between the industry and the MHRA is naturally close. There are regular interchanges of staff, common policy objectives, agreed processes, shared perspectives and routine contact and consultation. Many of the senior staff of the MHRA have previously worked with the industry …Overwhelmingly, the different parties appeared to speak the same language, with companies determined to observe the letter of the law and the regulators determined to uphold it.
Page 79: Such closeness provides the basis of the trust that the MHRA said it relied on as an integral part of the regulatory process.239 The MHRA Chairman suggested that trust underpinned the stance of the MHRA towards the companies they regulate. We inferred that this extended to the routine acceptance of companies’ summaries of the results of tests on their drugs as true reflections of the raw data on which they were based.
Page 79: Trust is critical in the relationship between regulators and industry. However, at the heart of this inquiry are the concerns of those who believe that the MHRA is too trusting. Trust should be based on robust evidence; …The evidence indicated that the MHRA examined primary (raw) data on drug effects only if it suspected some misrepresentation in the summary data supplied. It was argued that such trust in regulated companies goes too far: reliance on company summaries is neither sufficient nor appropriate, in the absence of effective audit and verification of data that companies provide. …Denial of access to information held by the [MHRA] puts the interests of pharmaceutical companies ahead of those of patients and prescribers. This is particularly indefensible in the light of evidence that regulatory agencies, supposedly established to protect the public, are acquiescing in biased later publication of the information they hold.
Page 79: Regulatory inertia was clearly illustrated through publication of the findings of the UK’s first ever public investigation into a drug safety problem:
Page 82: In setting up the review of SSRI antidepressants, the MHRA/CSM responded to another long-standing concern about regulatory activity: the possible conflicts of interest of regulators.
Page 83: user reports of often serious problems had been systematically discounted or ignored.
Page 85: In evidence to this Committee, Mr Brook expressed concerns about the influence of the industry on drug regulation, specifically the perceived threat by MHRA staff of legal entanglement resulting from regulatory action: …every time we made difficult decisions there was always this issue of: ‘We have got to be very careful because the pharmaceutical companies will sue us if we get this wrong; they will take us to court and take us through legal processes’; and it was very clear that the MRHA officials were very mindful the whole time of that dimension, to my view, more than the dimension of public health and public responsibility of the public.
Page 87: Further concerns, relating to the MHRA’s reliance on company summaries of data, rather than raw data are discussed elsewhere.
Page 96: A statement to the effect that heart problems were associated with Celebrex was issued by the MHRA in December 2004. In the statement, the Agency made it clear that it had not seen the actual data from the drug company but that its advice was based on information from Pfizer’s website.
Page 98: The regulatory authority, which is responsible for controlling much of the behaviour of the industry has significant failings. Lack of transparency has played a major part in allowing failings to continue. The traditional secrecy in the drug regulatory process has insulated regulators from the feedback that would otherwise check, test and stimulate their policies and performance. Failure can be measured by the MHRA’s poor history in recognising drug risks, poor communication and lack of public trust. Regulatory secrecy also underpins publication bias, and other unacceptable practices. The closeness that has developed between regulators and companies has deprived the industry of rigorous quality control and audit.
Page 102: Thirdly, procedures for investigating complaints about breaches of regulations are too slow, poorly enforced and weakly sanctioned.
Page 103: The MHRA does not routinely examine raw data submitted with the licence application but is dependent on summaries provided by the applicant. The Expert Working Group on SSRI’s report of December 2004 showed that summaries of information may not provide the detail required to assess drug risks adequately.
Page 106: The publication of misleading promotional material is a criminal offence and the punishment should befit such a status.
Page 106: The MHRA, like many regulatory organisations, is entirely funded by fees from those it regulates. However, unlike many regulators, it competes with other European agencies for fee income… dangers of the present arrangements….During this long inquiry we became aware of serious weaknesses in the MHRA. Worryingly, in both its written and oral evidence the Agency seemed oblivious to the critical views of outsiders and unable to accept that it had any obvious shortcomings, except those that could be remedied by more transparency. The Agency’s attitude to its public health responsibilities suggested some complacency and a lack of requisite
competency, reducing our confidence in its ability to undertake the reforms needed to earn and deserve public trust.
Page 117: The MHRA should put in place systematic procedures to randomly audit raw data.